

7 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SpINT, OCI

25X1 ATTENTION :

SUBJECT : Comments on Intelligence Communications
Procedure

REFERENCE : Draft Paper "Intelligence Communications
and Related Procedures," 17 March 1958,
Secret

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1. All of the comments by this Office are in accord with the need to improve the intelligence communications procedures. Attached are specific comments as prepared by the Communications Branch (S/COM) of ORR.

2. There are obviously specific formidable problems which would arise in the partial or complete installation of the communications model. Despite such problems, this Office believes that the model should now be tasked out to determine by what combinations (of equipment, personnel, etc.), and by what phasing could this model be translated into reality.

3. Considerations for these tasks should include equipment needs, variations in field station conditions, and headquarters distribution and selection problems. Further investigation of this proposed system could be organized in terms of the following phases:

- a. initial steps necessary to obtain within CIA minimum emergency communications* between headquarters and two field communications centers (one in Europe and one in the Far East); and
- b. desired mid-term and final goals in the development of the proposed system.

* roughly similar to emergency transmission via military nets.

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4. A vastly improved field to headquarters communications system would only accentuate an already serious distribution problem within headquarters. Time saved in transmission could be easily consumed in the distribution procedures unless changes were to be made here. One consideration which would ease such a situation involves planning so that traffic received on improved equipment can be handled easily over present printer systems when peak loads of tape requiring immediate distribution are received. While it is undesirable that equipment and procedural innovations be prisoners of existing facilities, the obverse is equally evident. The suggested improvements of the communications model should be engineered so that materials handled can be distributed by present communications equipment as well.

5. The variety of conditions under which field stations are established [redacted]

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[redacted] This means that no matter what general agreements may be reached on expansion and improvements in the intelligence communications system, implementation will be the result of a number of individual negotiations and will be subject to a variety of interpretations. In coping with these varying field conditions, establishment of equipment on site will be difficult in terms of who controls it, but even this problem will not be as great as the provision for adequate numbers of personnel in the field in order to prepare information for transmittal to headquarters.

6. The communications model is a complex proposition even when considered as links between the field and headquarters, but it is even more so when the lateral communication needs (both in the field and in headquarters) are included. [redacted]

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FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND REPORTS:

[redacted]

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Acting Chief, Control Staff
Office of Research and Reports

Attachment:

As per para 1

29 April 1958

S/COM Comments on the [] Paper

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The problem posed by [] is indeed a real one. Our communication today, internal and external, is far too manual and far too physical to be either fast or economical. To meet the needs of today's "time", communication needs to be far more automatic and far more electrical. If one were to use the New York Times foreign reporting service as an ideal, one would be forced to admit that we have a very, very long way to go, even though that ideal is probably not wholly achievable in the intelligence field.

As we see it, the major parts of the problem are:

1. Evaluating the collected material at the point of collection. This should, among other things, determine the kind of onward handling from that point.
2. Transmission processing of the collected material at the point of collection once and only once in final form for Washington users. For purpose of illustration, let's say by flexo-writer, one item to a 5x8 card* stencil and a tape for teletype transmission.
3. Transmitting the prepared stencil card by physical transport, or the card tape by teletype to Washington using on-line, one-time encipherment tape.
4. Reception processing of the 5x8 stenciled card as received physically or by teletype in which the card is appropriately numbered, caveated, reclassified, etc., after which the appropriate number of copies are run off on high-speed reproduction machines.
5. Distributing sufficient copies of the card so as to eliminate the lost time involved in distributing multiple-routed copies.

Obviously the above breakdown of the problem is greatly oversimplified. The key to the time -- and perhaps cost -- problem seems to be the mechanization of the origin and terminal processing operations. In order not to lose the benefits of this savings in time -- and expense --

* There are numerous obvious advantages to a standardized one-item card.

25X1 the system needs to be supported by a modern telegraph (and facsimile) network as proposed [redacted] The speed and capacity of the circuits of such a network should of course be a function of the kind and density of traffic.

An undertaking of this sort requires organization:

1. To analyze the problems
2. To engineer systems and methods solutions
3. To implement these systems and methods
4. To manage the system on a continuing basis:
 - a. For centralized control
 - b. For measurement of performance
 - c. For taking corrective actions and for effecting improvements

25X1 We agree heartily [redacted] that the ultimate objective should be a centralized Washington system to serve the whole intelligence community. We also agree that CIA should show its leadership and "Central" functions by example through the establishment of a model to serve CIA, which can be extended in due course.